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The COVID-19 pandemic brought about a fast and severe global economic decline. By the
end of March 2020, the United States economy had lost over 13 million jobs, compared to 9 million
jobs lost during the Great Recession (Cajner et al. 2020). Although some of the effects were
mitigated by government interventions—increased unemployment insurance (UI), stimulus
checks, government assistance to private entities, and other public assistance—changes in asset
prices, employment, and consumption were substantial.
In this paper, we use tax data to document how retirement savings—specifically,
contributions to and withdrawals from tax-preferred savings accounts—changed during the
COVID-19 pandemic in comparison to the Great Recession (from 2008 to 2010). Retirement
savings behavior might plausibly have been affected both by the pandemic (and related recession)
itself, as well as by the policy actions that Congress took in response to the pandemic.
We find little change in individuals’ contributions to retirement plans in 2020, which
increased from the previous year at a rate in line with recent trends, a stark difference from the
drop in contributions that occurred during the 2008-09 Great Recession (Argento et al. 2015;
Goodman et al. 2021). This may have occurred because the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
were disproportionately worse for workers at the bottom of the income distribution, who save at
much lower rates than middle- and high-income earners, while the earnings shocks during the
Great Recession affected middle- and high-income workers to a greater degree than during
COVID-19 (Larrimore et al. 2022). At the same time, we observe in publicly available Form 5500
data that employers reduced contributions to defined contribution (DC) plans.
Conversely, retirement plan withdrawal patterns in 2020 were meaningfully different from
prior years, falling for older individuals and increasing for younger people. Both patterns were
influenced by policy changes that Congress made in response to the pandemic. First, the
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requirement for older individuals to take certain withdrawals (known as required minimum
distributions, or RMDs) was suspended in 2020. We find that people responded to this policy by
sharply reducing their withdrawals, much as they did in response to the suspension of those same
requirements in 2009. Second, Congress granted broad (but not complete) relief from the 10
percent penalty that applies to most early withdrawals made by individuals under age 59½. Using
bunching methods, we find clear evidence that some individuals responded to this policy by taking
large withdrawals near the exemption limit (approximately $100,000). Individuals who took such
withdrawals were more likely to have experienced business losses and to have unemployment
insurance income in 2020. At the same time, we also find that many people (at least, those near
age 59½) took withdrawals consistent with the penalty remaining in place.
Our analysis builds on prior research examining the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic—
and subsequent federal policy changes—on economic activity. Prior work has examined changes
in unemployment and inequality (Bartik et al. 2020; Cajner et al. 2020; Clark et al. 2021; Coibion
et al. 2020; Guerrieri et al. 2020), consumer spending (Chetty et al. 2020), and early retirement
(Goda et al. 2021; Bui et al. 2020; Davis 2021) during the pandemic. Others have studied the
effects of both federal and state government interventions during the pandemic including stay-athome orders (Forsythe et al. 2020), and federal assistance programs like unemployment insurance
and stimulus payments (Baker et al. 2020; Chetty et al. 2020; Larrimore et al. 2022).
We also contribute to the body of work exploring the effect of economic shocks and policy
changes on retirement savings. Hurwitz et al. (2021) found that economically-vulnerable
individuals are more likely to recommend savings reductions in the response to the onset of
COVID. On the topic of RMDs, Brown et al. (2017) showed that the suspension of RMDs in 2009
resulted in a large decrease in withdrawals for TIAA-CREF retirement savings participants,
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particularly among relatively wealthier individuals with large balances, and those with longer
retirement horizons (people closer to the starting age for RMDs). Mortenson et al. (2019) found
that 32 to 52 percent of individuals subject to RMDs would prefer to take a withdrawal below the
required minimum, but that even when the RMD is suspended, some individuals take withdrawals
at the ‘phantom’ (i.e., not in effect for that year) RMD threshold. Bershadker and Smith (2005)
also estimated, using Current Population Survey (CPS) data, that about 45 percent of individuals
with positive account balances did not take withdrawals until they were required to do so by law.
Research exploring the effect of the early withdrawal penalty is sparser than the RMD
literature. Goda et al. (2016) measured individuals’ responsiveness to the penalty by estimating the
increase in withdrawals at the threshold age of 59½, finding that the probability of a withdrawal
increased by 93 percent at this age. Stuart and Bryant (2021) similarly documented that early
withdrawal penalties (and RMDs) substantially influence timing or withdrawals from retirement
accounts. Several studies found that the likelihood of taking early withdrawals increased
significantly with negative shocks, including divorce and job loss or wage reduction, the latter of
which applies directly to the COVID-19 employment shocks (Argento et al. 2015; Amromin and
Smith 2003; Goodman et al. 2021; Brady and Bass 2019). Focusing on the Great Recession,
Argento et al. (2015) also reported that contributions to DC plans declined significantly, and
Goodman et al. (2021) found that net contributions did not recover their inflation-adjusted 2007
levels until 2014. Both papers also found that early withdrawals increased during the Great
Recession, although to a smaller extent than the change in contributions. Goodman et al. (2021)
reported that the share of contributions made by working age Americans who exited the retirement
saving system increased modestly during the Great Recession, from a base rate of around 22
percent to 26 percent in 2009.
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There has also been a focus on the effects of economic downturns on early retirement.
Coile and Levine (2007) reported that economic downturns caused an increase in the percent of
people who decided to retire, equivalent to the effect of a negative health shock or retirement
incentives. Neumark and Button (2014) noted that age discrimination was a problem for workers
nearing retirement during the Great Recession. However, Goda et al. (2011) found that, during the
Great Recession, the probability of retiring early actually went down, which may have been a
reaction to stock market conditions at that time. More recently, Coile and Zhang (forthcoming)
found that retirements increased during the COVID-19 pandemic, but that this trend was unrelated
to economic circumstances and was more likely due to general concerns about health, changes in
government policies, or stock market and real estate gains.
However, as Goda et al. (2021) found, despite evidence suggesting that the COVID-19
pandemic caused an increase in early retirement, there was no significant increase in applications
for social security benefits. Similarly, Maestas and Mullen (forthcoming) found that the number
of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) applicants fell continuously between March 2020
and January 2021, although they also observed that the number of SSDI applications received at
field offices began to increase again in 2021. Both papers speculated that the drop in applications
may be partially explained by increases in unemployment insurance and the issuance of stimulus
checks in 2020, possibly giving individuals some financial flexibility to hold off on claiming SSDI
benefits. These studies are in line with our findings, as we do not see an increase in retirement
withdrawals for individuals between the ages of 60 and 70.

Background and Policy Changes
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Under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act of 2020, the rules
for distributions and withdrawals from retirement accounts changed in two ways: required
minimum distributions were temporarily suspended, and ‘coronavirus-related’ early withdrawals
were exempted from early distribution penalties. There were also changes to rules regarding
rollovers, loan limits and repayments, and partial plan terminations, but we omit these from our
discussion as they are beyond the scope of our analysis. 1
In general, owners of IRAs and DC accounts must begin taking withdrawals known as
RMDs from their accounts in the year in which they reach age 72. These withdrawals are equal to
a specified fraction of their prior-year balance. In the CARES Act, Congress suspended RMDs for
calendar year 2020, meaning that no such withdrawals were required during that year. 2 Congress
granted similar relief during the Great Recession, suspending RMDs in 2009 (JCT 2020; Topoleski
and Myers 2020).
Non-rollover withdrawals from IRAs and DC accounts made prior to age 59½ are generally
subject to a 10 percent penalty, in addition to (for traditional, non-Roth accounts) being subject to
ordinary income tax at the time of withdrawal. In the CARES Act, Congress created an exception
from the early withdrawal penalty for ‘coronavirus-related’ withdrawals from IRAs or eligible
retirement plans (such as employer provided 401(k) and 403(b) plans). This exception was quite
broad: it applied to withdrawals up to $100,000 received by any individual who experienced selfattested economic or health hardships during 2020. 3 The law also permitted the recognition of
coronavirus-related withdrawals over three years, rather than at the time of this withdrawal, which
provided taxpayers with greater liquidity, allowed them to take advantage of the time value of
money, and provided an opportunity to smooth their income and minimize tax payments under a
progressive tax schedule. The law additionally permitted individuals to ‘recontribute’ coronavirus-
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related withdrawals at any point in 2020, 2021, or 2022, by making contributions back into the
distributing account. All such repayments were to be treated as if they were never withdrawn (i.e.,
there would be no income inclusion).

Data
The data we use to generate the estimates, figures, and tables in this paper are drawn from
administrative tax records in the United States. These include data compiled from Form 1040, filed
by individual taxpayers, and many information returns filed by third parties including Forms W2, 1099-R, 1099-SSA, and 5498. The base data are in the form of an unbalanced individual-level
panel including five percent of all individuals in the US tax population. 4 While the panel is
unbalanced, it is representative of the population of taxpayers within each year from 2003 to 2020.
Individuals can enter the panel by immigration, birth, or receiving a tax form, and they can exit
the panel by emigration, death, or failing to receive a tax form. 5
Here we rely most heavily on several pieces of information retrieved from administrative
data: date of birth and death from the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) DM-1 file, IRA
contributions from Form 5498, wages and deferred contributions from Form W-2 (wages), social
security benefits from Form 1099-SSA, and retirement distributions from Form 1099-R. All dollar
amounts are adjusted to 2020 price levels using chained CPI.
Form 1099-R allows us to distinguish between distributions made from IRAs, Roth IRAs,
and workplace pension plans. Yet within the category of workplace pension plans, we are unable
to distinguish between distributions made from defined contribution (DC) plans and those made
from defined benefit (DB) plans. Goodman et al. (2021) previously applied an algorithm to classify
distributions reported on Form 1099-R as DB or DC based on various factors, but it is unable to
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classify data from 2020 because it requires several years of ‘burn-out’ (i.e., the last several years
of data are used to classify earlier distributions but cannot be classified themselves). Therefore,
when analyzing distributions from workplace pension plans, we combine both types of
distributions.
Additionally, for the purpose of calculating contributions made by employers to retirement
plans, we make use of publicly available data from Form 5500. All retirement plans covered by
ERISA must file Form 5500. The form contains a variety of information including total
participants, participants contributions, and employer contributions. 6
Unless stated otherwise, all dollar values in this paper are indexed to inflation using the
Chained CPI series; we express our findings in 2020 dollars.

Retirement Savings Changes
Contributions. We begin by examining the aggregate amount of contributions made by
individuals and employers to employer-sponsored DC accounts and IRAs. The upper panel (Figure
1a) displays total contributions, while the bottom panel (Figure 1b) indexes each series to one in
2019. The figure shows that, during the Great Recession, contributions of all types fell. For
example, employee contributions to DC plans fell from $269 billion in 2007 to $253 billion in
2009, a 6 percent reduction. Employer contributions fell even more sharply from 2007 to 2008,
falling 18 percent from $235 billion to $193 billion. Direct IRA contributions fell from a peak of
$73 billion in 2007 to a low of $58 billion in 2012, a 21 percent reduction. 7
Figure 1 here
We find significantly different patterns for individual contributions at the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Employee contributions to DC plans remained on a steady growth path,
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growing 5 percent from 2019 to 2020—similar to the yearly growth rates experienced from 2017
onward. In fact, direct IRA contributions by individuals accelerated somewhat, growing 10 percent
from 2019 to 2020. Employer contributions, however, fell noticeably, declining by 12 percent from
2019 to 2020.
There are several explanations for the disparate pattern we see during the COVID-19
pandemic in comparison to the Great Recession. First, retirement savings are concentrated in the
upper half of the wage income distribution: in 2019, approximately 90 percent of contributions to
employer-sponsored defined contribution plans were made by workers in the top two quintiles of
the wage distribution. As shown in Larrimore et al. (2022), the labor income shocks of the COVID19 recession were concentrated in the lower half of the wage earnings distribution relative to the
Great Recession, reducing the scope for negative income shocks to affect retirement contributions
in the aggregate. At the same time, large firms responsible for the bulk of employer DC
contributions received comparatively less direct fiscal support, as they were mostly ineligible for
programs such as the Paycheck Protection Program; this may partially explain why employers
reduced contributions. 8
Second, the pandemic and associated closures reduced the marginal utility of consumption,
especially in the upper half of the income distribution. As Chetty et. al. (2020) found, consumer
spending among those in the bottom quartile of the US income distribution remained about the
same after June 2020; however, consumption among those in the top quartile of income dropped
by about 13 percent. This reduction in the opportunity cost of contributing to a retirement account
made retirement saving relatively more attractive, pushing against any reductions in saving caused
by negative labor income shocks. There is no direct analogue of this part of the pandemic
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experience for employers; thus, this may be a further explanation for the divergence between
employee and employer contributions during the pandemic.
To further explore contribution changes, Figure 2 displays the time series of employee
contributions to DC accounts according to earnings groups (which we define as wage earnings
plus unemployment insurance). 9 Specifically, the groups are (1) the bottom half of the wage
distribution, (2) percentiles 51-80, (3) percentiles 81-95, and (4) the top five percentiles. The top
panel (Figure 2a) plots the dollar amounts, in billions. There are large differences in levels between
the groups. In 2019, the bottom 50 percentiles were responsible for only 10 percent of total
contributions, percentiles 51-80 were responsible for 26 percent, percentiles 81-95 were
responsible for 38 percent, and the top 5 percentiles were responsible for 26 percent.
Figure 2 here
The bottom panel (Figure 2b) plots each of these series indexed to the base in 2019. This
figure reveals that, during the Great Recession, contributions fell relatively more in lower income
groups. In the bottom 50 percentiles, contributions fell by 21 percent from 2007 and 2011; in the
top 5 percentiles, contributions fell by only 2 percent from 2007 to 2008 before growing again.
The two intermediate income groups had contributions decreases between these two extremes. By
contrast, contributions in all incomes groups grew from 2019 to 2020, each at a growth rate broadly
in line with growth rates in previous years. It is possible that the substantial fiscal support to lowand middle-income individuals prevented the large decreases in retirement contributions among
this group that occurred during the Great Recession.
Of course, stock market conditions differed dramatically between the Great Recession and
the COVID-19 pandemic. In October of 2007, the S&P 500 attained a high of 1,565, after which
it tumbled over the course of 17 months to achieve a nadir of 677 in March of 2009, before
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embarking on a steady recovery. It did not revert to its October 2007 value until April 2013. By
contrast, the COVID-19 pandemic saw only a very brief downturn. On January 31, 2020, the S&P
500 closed at 3,226, then fell to a low of 2,237 on March 23, 2020, then proceeded to recover
rapidly. The market re-attained its January 31, 2020, value by June 8, 2020. Given the well-known
recency bias in investment decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman 1973)—especially by retail
investors who are responsible for the bulk of retirement savings (Nofsinger and Varma 2013)—
the longer bear market during the Great Recession may have had a larger effect on contributions
than the V-shaped market during the COVID pandemic.
Withdrawals. Figure 3 plots aggregate withdrawals (non-rollover or conversion distributions)
from IRAs and employer plans over time. As with Figures 1 and 2, the top panel (Figure 3a) plots
the aggregate dollar amounts while the bottom panel (Figure 3b) indexes each series to one in
2019. Roughly speaking, both IRA and employer account withdrawals follow a smooth upward
trend over time, with IRA distributions generally growing faster. In both 2009 and 2020—years in
which RMDs were suspended—there are noticeable reductions in IRA withdrawals. By contrast,
in 2020, employer plan withdrawals grew by 10 percent, considerably faster than the 2-4 percent
annual growth rates in prior years.
Figure 3 here
In Figure 4, we disaggregate the withdrawal trends in Figure 3 for specific time periods,
plotting mean withdrawals by age, from 2008 to 2010 (Figures 4a and 4b), and from 2018 to 2020
(Figures 4c and 4d). Figure 4a shows the change in mean withdrawals from IRAs by age during
the Great Recession, from 2008 to 2010. Figure 4b does the same for non-IRA accounts—
primarily employer sponsored defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) plans—from
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2008 to 2010. Figures 4c and 4d are analogous figures for the COVID recession, comparing 20182019 with 2020.
Figure 4 here
Several facts emerge. First, withdrawals from IRAs fell substantially in 2009 and 2020 for
ages that would otherwise be subject to RMD. Second, we see no large changes in withdrawals in
those same years for individuals aged 60-70, people relatively unaffected by the major policy
changes. Third, while withdrawals from workplace DB and DC pension plans remained similar
across years during the Great Recession, there is a noticeable increase in early withdrawals for
pre-retirement-age cohorts in 2020 relative to the previous two years.
The effects of the 2020 RMD suspension are consistent with the same 2009 policy change.
In Figure 5, we graph the mass of withdrawals from IRAs taken by 75-year-olds scaled by their
prior year balance, with reference to their RMD (or what the RMD would have been in the absence
of the rule suspension). 10 The top panel (Figure 5a) plots withdrawal levels in 2009 (line) along
with the same withdrawal levels in 2008 (dots), and the bottom panel (Figure 5b) plots withdrawal
levels in 2020 (line) and 2019 (dots) for comparison. In both cases, there is a substantial shifting
of mass from exactly the RMD to zero. Furthermore, there remains some mass at the RMD in 2009
and 2020, potentially reflecting a mix of inertia, a perception of the RMD as ‘guidance,’ or
withdrawals taken during the year prior to the policy change (Brown et al. 2017; Mortenson et al.
2019).
Figure 5 here
The population near retirement age is also of interest, as there has been concern that the
pandemic and related recession induced people to retire earlier than they otherwise would, a
concern corroborated by labor force participation data (Davis 2021; Schwartz and Marcos 2021;
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Van Dam 2021; Hsu 2021). Yet we see no obvious increase in retirement withdrawals for those
age 60-70. Furthermore, Goda et al. (2021) showed that the number of applications to file for social
security retirement benefits also remained largely unchanged during the pandemic. Thus, there is
no evidence of near-retirement age individuals decumulating their retirement wealth—whether in
the form of social security, pensions, or IRAs—earlier than they otherwise would have. If the
pandemic did cause early retirement, then early retirees would have to be financing their
consumption through some other source. Perhaps, as suggested by Goda et al. (2021), increased
unemployment insurance and other forms of pandemic assistance allowed some to finance an early
retirement without needing to dip into retirement wealth.
The increase in workplace pension withdrawals for those of working age likely reflects
both a response to policy changes and direct effects of the pandemic. In Figure 6, we plot a time
series of the total withdrawals from pensions and IRAs (excluding rollovers, Roth conversions,
etc.) and total penalized withdrawals for those below age 59½. 11 While total withdrawals increased
by $60 billion (25%) in 2020 for this group, the total amount of penalized distributions fell by
nearly 50 percent. Thus, it appears that take-up of the penalty suspension was quite high.
Figure 6 here
There was a smaller take-up of the CARES Act provision that allowed for the income
recognition of withdrawals to be spread over three years. In particular, we see that only 1.5 percent
of tax units that took withdrawals from retirement accounts reported taxable pension and IRA
amounts, approximately equal to 1/3 of total withdrawals from Form 1099-R. Low take-up rates
under this provision suggests that the ‘hassle’ costs of needing to track this information to
subsequent tax returns exceeded the value of the deferral of liability or other tax savings. 12
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There is clear evidence that some pre-retirement age individuals did respond to a
combination of these policies. Recall that the penalty suspension and the three-year recognition
rule applied to up to $100,000 of withdrawals for any given individual. Figure 7 shows bunching
at this threshold in 2020: approximately 165,000 individuals (age 20-58) took a withdrawal within
$500 of $100,000, far larger than any nearby bins of the same width. This was not driven by roundnumber bunching, as we saw no analogous pattern in 2019. 13 Under the extreme assumption that
these individuals would not have taken any withdrawals at all in 2020 in the absence of the policy
changes, then these bunchers would account for approximately $17 billion of the $65 billion
increase in withdrawals from 2019 to 2020 for this age group. We cannot test this assumption
directly, but we believe that it is a plausible approximation: only 10 percent of these individuals
took a withdrawal of any amount in 2019. Taken together, this suggests that a non-trivial portion
of the increase in withdrawals from 2019 to 2020 was driven by policy.
Figure 7 here
These bunchers could plausibly have been responding to any of the policy changes that
applied to coronavirus-related withdrawals. We interpret the bunching mainly to the penalty
suspension for two reasons. First, we find that the probability of paying a penalty was substantially
lower for those in the bin nearest to $100,000 in withdrawals relative to those in nearby bins.
Second, only 7 percent of these bunchers took up the three-year recognition option, using the proxy
described above (taxable withdrawals approximately equal to one third of total withdrawals).
We are particularly interested in the characteristics of those who appeared to be responding
to this policy; see Table 1. The first column restricts the same to those age 20-58 who took
distributions within $500 of $100,000. In column 2, we report the same statistics for the remainder
of our 2020 sample within the same age range. In the first row, we find that bunchers had a
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considerably higher 2019 AGI than average, which is unsurprising given that higher-income
individuals are likely to accumulate large retirement account balances. We also find that bunchers
were somewhat more likely to have had non-zero business income in 2019, UI income in 2020,
and a business loss in 2020. However, bunchers also had a slightly higher wage share of income
than the remainder of the sample.
Table 1 here
In column 3, we reweight the sample in column 2 within income percentiles to match the
2019 AGI distribution of bunchers (column 1). In this reweighted sample, we can examine whether
bunchers differed from others along other dimensions, beyond what can be explained by the fact
that they were higher earners. We find that bunchers were somewhat less likely than their incomematched peers to have had non-zero business income in 2019, and their wage share of income was
much higher. One explanation for this pattern is that retirement savings might be much easier (or
a more attractive option for foregone consumption) for wage earners relative to entrepreneurs at a
given income level. At the same time, we find that bunchers did appear to experience greater
economic distress than their income-matched peers: they were over 60 percent more likely to have
UI income and nearly 80 percent more likely to have a business loss, despite being likely to have
had non-zero business income in the prior year. This suggests that these bunchers could have used
the withdrawals to smooth consumption or provide liquidity to their businesses.
While the evidence on bunching indicates that the relaxation of the early withdrawal
penalty played a role in increasing withdrawals in 2020, we also find evidence that many
individuals still felt constrained by the penalty, at least to some extent. Following Goda et al.
(2016), we examine the probability of taking withdrawals as a function of monthly age in the
vicinity of 59½. Consider the series marked with circles (2019) in each panel of Figure 8.
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Individuals indicated with relative age 0 are those who reached age 59½ in January of 2020—they
had zero months in 2019 during which to take penalty-free withdrawals. Moving leftward in the
graph corresponds to even younger individuals (i.e., who reached age 59½ later in the year) who
also had zero penalty-free months in 2019. Moving to the right corresponds to individuals who
had more months of penalty-free withdrawals: at relative age 12 months, the entire year was
penalty-free. Clearly there were changes in the slope of the probability of taking a non-IRA
withdrawal (top panel) or an IRA withdrawal (bottom panel) at relative age 0 and 12 months,
suggesting that the probability of taking a non-IRA withdrawal in any given year increased
approximately linearly in the number of penalty-free months during that year.
Figure 8 here
The key empirical test is whether these discontinuous changes in slope were present in
2020 as well. If people perceived the relief for pandemic-related withdrawals as effectively
eliminating the penalty for all withdrawals, then there should be no slope change; all individuals
would have faced 12 months of penalty-free withdrawals. 14 Yet we see very similar slope changes
at 0 and 12 months in 2020 versus 2019. For the non-IRA series, the patterns across the two years
are indistinguishable, potentially reflecting measurement error introduced by the fact that both
series include DB withdrawals (usually) not subject to the penalty. There is a more noticeable
difference in the IRA series: the change in slope in 2020 was statistically significantly smaller than
the change in slope in 2019. Yet the difference is modest in magnitude, as the change in slope
shrank by only 17 percent.
Figures 7 and 8 together suggest a nuanced, heterogeneous response to the relief granted
to the pandemic-related withdrawals. Figure 7 suggests that a select group of about 140,000 people
responded to the policy in a sophisticated way, and the behavior of this group was large enough to
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affect aggregate withdrawals. Meanwhile, Figure 8 suggests that most individuals took
withdrawals in a manner consistent with the penalty remaining in place, either because they did
not deem their distributions to be coronavirus-related (i.e., the penalty would have applied), or
because they were unaware of the penalty suspension.
Finally, we note that it is likely that some of the increase in withdrawals by working-age
persons in 2020 was not the result of policy, but rather the result of the economic environment. As
shown in Goodman et al. (2021), job separation was associated with a substantial increase in the
probability of working-age persons taking retirement withdrawals. This could have been caused
by the income shock associated with job separation, as well as the choice architecture that often
makes withdrawals the default (easiest) option for those with accumulated DC balances in their
previous jobs. Thus, the large increase in job separation that occurred in 2020 may have
contributed to the increase in withdrawals in this period. In future research, when we are able to
observe W-2 data from 2021, necessary for determining whether individuals separated from their
employers, we intend to quantify the role of increased job separation on withdrawals in 2020.

Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic had many negative consequences that persisted for some time.
The sharp increase in unemployment, supply-chain issues, increasing prices, and hesitancy of
workers to return to the labor force all produced strains on the economy. Nevertheless, due to the
differential impacts of the pandemic across the workforce, aggregate individual contributions to
retirement accounts remained largely the same, even increasing beyond what was expected for
high-income workers, though contributions by employers did decrease somewhat. Withdrawals by
working-age individuals from employer-sponsored retirement accounts did rise substantially
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during 2020, driven, at least to some extent, by a response to relief granted to certain early
withdrawals, including the elimination of the 10 percent early distribution penalty for coronavirusrelated reasons. A portion of this increase was also likely driven by the increase in job separations
created by the pandemic. Withdrawals from IRAs to those over age 70 dropped precipitously,
suggesting a strong response to the suspension of required minimum distribution rules. The source
of the asymmetric response in IRAs and employer-sponsored plans to these two policy changes is
unclear, but it is likely driven by the co-mingling of defined benefit withdrawals with defined
contribution withdrawals in tax data reporting and the age-life cycle of IRA balances.
In general, the effects of retirement-related policies implemented during the COVID-19
pandemic are ambiguous when it comes to providing relief for people facing financial difficulties,
especially in comparison to other targeted policies such as expansions in Unemployment
Insurance, the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), Medicare and Medicaid. As
Moffitt and Ziliak (forthcoming) found, SNAP take-up increased during recessions not only among
young, low-income groups but also for older people (particularly for those age 50-and 61).
Moreover, UI claims increased for several groups as well, including the elderly (age 62+) and for
the higher-educated. These increases may also help explain why the pandemic did not precipitate
a large increase in social security claims (Maestas and Mullen, forthcoming). Similarly, policies
directed at lowering costs of healthcare for the low-income and elderly have been important, as
out-of-pocket medical expenses account for a much larger share of spending in this subpopulation.
As Follette and Sheiner (forthcoming) found, changes in Medicare payment policies introduced in
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) were also instrumental in slowing the rising cost of healthcare for
older Americans.
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Endnotes
1

Specifically, the CARES Act allowed plans to increase the section 72(p) loan limit from $50,000

to $100,000 for certain loans and allowed plans to elect to suspend certain loan payments. The
CARES Act also protected employers from inadvertently generating a ‘plan termination’ if a large
share of its workforce separated from employment.
2

The SECURE Act changed the threshold age from 70.5 to 72. This change would have taken

effect in 2020 if Congress had not passed the RMD holiday in the CARES Act.
3

Employers can choose whether to implement these coronavirus-related distribution and loan

rules; however, qualified individuals can claim the tax benefits of the coronavirus-related
distribution rules even if plan provisions aren't changed (IRS 2022).
4

The tax population—those individuals who appear on a federal income tax return (1040) or

information return (e.g., Form W-2) includes roughly 98% of the Census resident population in
each year (Larrimore et al. 2022).
5

These base data have been used in several prior papers (Mortenson et al. 2019; Goodman et al.

2021; Larrimore et al. 2022).
6

For details, see US Department of Labor (nd).

7

Recall that all dollar values in this paper are indexed to inflation and expressed in 2020 price

levels.
8

Large firms did receive relief of various forms, such as the Employee Retention Credit and the

ability to carry back tax losses incurred in 2019 or 2020.
9

Wage earnings are defined as box 5 from Form W-2, Medicare Wages.

10

We display the results for 75-year-olds here, but the results are similar for other age groups

subject to RMDs.
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11

We proxy for penalized distributions, because they are not directly observed in the tax data we

use, as retirement-related penalties reported on Form 1040 among people younger than age 59½
divided by 10% (the penalty amount).
12

We currently lack the data to analyze the take-up of the CARES Act provision that allows for

subsequent repayment of coronavirus-related withdrawals.
13

We do not inflation-adjust in this figure.

14

Given that the CARES Act passed at the end of March 2020, one might expect a kink at relative

age 9 months (i.e., those attaining 59½ around March or April 2020) rather than relative age 12
months. But this should not affect the kink at relative age equal to zero months (i.e., those attaining
age 59½ near the end of 2020).
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1b. Relative contributions to retirement plans over time (indexed to 2019)
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Figure 1. Aggregate DC and IRA contributions by year
Notes: This figure plots three series of total contributions to retirement plans. The three series are
employee contributions to DC plans, employer contributions to DC plans, and individual
contributions to IRAs (excluding rollovers and similar transfers). The top panel (Figure 1a) plots
the dollar amounts in billions; the bottom panel (Figure 1b) plots the same series indexed to one
in 2019.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns. All dollar amounts are adjusted to inflation using the chained
CPI and expressed in 2020 dollars.
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2a. Annual employee contributions to retirement plans over time (dollars)
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2b. Relative employee contributions to retirement plans over time (indexed to 2019)
Amount (indexed to 1 in 2019)

1.1
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
2004

2008
0-50

2012
Year
51-80

81-95

2016

2020

96-100

Figure 2. Employee DC contributions by income groups
Notes: This figure plots total employee contributions to DC plans in four earnings groups, defined
by the sum of current-year wage income and unemployment insurance income. The top panel
(Figure 2a) plots the dollar amounts in billions; the bottom panel (Figure 2b) plots the same series
indexed to one in 2019.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns. All dollar amounts are adjusted to inflation using the chained
CPI and expressed in 2020 dollars.
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3a. Annual aggregate withdrawals retirement plan over time (dollars)
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3b. Annual relative aggregate withdrawals from retirement plan over time (indexed to 2019)
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Figure 3. IRAs and other retirement withdrawals, by year
Notes: This figure plots a time series of withdrawals from retirement plans. Panel (a) plots the total
dollar amount of withdrawals from IRAs and non-IRAs, the latter of which primarily represents
employer DC and DB plans. Panel (b) plots the same two series but indexed to a value of one in
2019.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns. All dollar amounts are adjusted to inflation using the chained
CPI and expressed in 2020 dollars.
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Figure 4d. Non-IRA Withdrawals, 2018-2020

Early Withdrawals

RMDs Begin

20

40
2018

60
Age

2019

80

100
2020

Figure 4. Mean withdrawals from IRAs and other retirement accounts, by age
Notes: This figure plots mean withdrawals from IRAs (panels (a) and (b)) and workplace defined
contribution and defined benefit plans (panels (b) and (d)) as a function of age, separately by year.
Withdrawals are derived from Form 1099-R and exclude rollovers and Roth conversions. All dollar
amounts are adjusted to 2020 price levels. The sample is representative of all individuals of a given
age that appear on a tax return or an information return, including those who do not take a
withdrawal.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns. All dollar amounts are adjusted to inflation using the chained
CPI and expressed in 2020 dollars.
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5a. IRA withdrawals 2008-2009
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5b. IRA withdrawals 2019-2020
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Figure 5. Counts of IRA withdrawals as a percent of prior year balance for 75-year-olds
Notes: This figure plots a histogram of IRA withdrawals for 75-year-olds, scaled by prior year IRA
balance, separately by year. In each panel, the blue dots represent the series in the years in which
RMDs are in effect (2008 and 2019) and the green line represents the series in years in which
RMDs have been suspended (2009 and 2020). The vertical line indicates the standard RMD
amount for 75-year-olds. Withdrawals are derived from Form 1099-R and exclude rollovers and
Roth conversions.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns.

Withdrawals (billions of 2020 dollars)
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Figure 6. Total IRA withdrawals and penalized withdrawals by those under age 59.5
Notes: This figure plots withdrawals and (estimated) penalized withdrawals made to tax units with
at least one member under age 59.5. Withdrawals are derived from Form 1099-R and exclude
rollovers and Roth conversions. We estimate penalized withdrawals as equal to the penalty amount
on Form 1040 divided by 0.1. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2020 price levels.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns. All dollar amounts are adjusted to inflation using the chained
CPI and expressed in 2020 dollars.
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Figure 7. Total IRA withdrawals close to a $100,000 threshold, 2019-2020
Notes: This figure plots a histogram of total withdrawals from IRAs and workplace plans made to
individuals, broken out by the dollar amount of withdrawals made by an individual. The horizontal
axis are thousand-dollar wide bins, and the vertical axis displays the total dollars of withdrawals
made within each bin. Withdrawals are measured on Form 1099-R and exclude rollovers and Roth
conversions. Only individuals between the ages of 20 and 58 are included.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns. In this figure, dollar amounts are not adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 8. Probability of taking retirement plan withdrawals by age, close to age 59½
Notes: This figure plots the mean value of a dummy for taking any withdrawal from a workplace
retirement plan (top panel) or IRA (bottom panel) as a function of monthly age, relative to 59½,
separately by year. An individual with monthly age one attains 59½ in December of the given year,
while an individual with monthly age zero attains 59½ in January of the subsequent year.
Withdrawals are derived from Form 1099-R and exclude rollovers and Roth conversions. All dollar
amounts are adjusted to 2020 price levels.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns.
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Table 1. Characteristics of those taking retirement plan distributions close to $100,000 in 2020

Median AGI in 2019
Share with nonzero business income in 2019
Wage share of income in 2019
Share with UI in 2020
Share with business loss in 2020

Bunchers

Non-bunchers

Non-bunchers
Reweighted

$129,000
0.199
0.748
0.232
0.186

$31,000
0.15
0.71
0.199
0.063

$129,000
0.242
0.551
0.141
0.104

Notes: Column 1 reports characteristics of those age 20-58 taking distributions of approximately
$100,000 in 2020. Column 2 reports characteristics for all other individuals aged 20-58. In column
3, we report characteristics for the sample in column 2 except that we reweight the sample in order
to match the distribution of 2019 AGI of those in column 1. Business income refers to income
reported on Schedules C, E, and F. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2020 price levels.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on a 5 percent random sample of IRS records derived from
tax returns and information returns. All dollar amounts are adjusted to inflation using the chained
CPI and expressed in 2020 dollars.

